

READ AHEAD FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Zambia Visit

November 2015

- (U) The following is intended to provide you with updates on issues of interest for your visit to Zambia.
- (U) Your first official trip to Zambia will provide an opportunity to highlight U.S. engagement efforts in Southern Africa; to thank the Government of Zambia for hosting Exercise SOUTHERN ACCORD; to encourage Zambia's continued contributions to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations; and to provide opportunity for further military-to-military engagement with the incipient Marine unit of the Zambian Defense Force (ZDF).
- (U) Previous U.S. senior-level engagements in Zambia have included then-Secretary of State Clinton's co-hosting of the 2011 African Growth Opportunity Summit (AGOA), an annual engagement in support of AGOA activities to combat corruption and open trade. Zambia is additionally a major recipient of funding under the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).
- (U) The most recent high-level delegation to visit to Zambia included Second Lady Dr. Jill Biden, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah, and U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women's Issues Catherine Russell in July 2014, highlighting issues of women's health, development, and education.

(U) Internal Context

- (U) Beginning with its independence from the United Kingdom in 1964, Zambia fell into the traditional African pattern of an anti-colonialist leader becoming president of a multi-party state followed by becoming strongman of a single-party state. In the case of Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda, who ruled from 1964-1991, the combination of age and pressure of the flagging domestic economy initiated the return to a multi-party democracy. The current president, Edgar Lungu, was promoted from his previous post as Minister of Defense (a portfolio he retained until September 2015) upon the 2014 death of his predecessor, President Michael Sata. In 2016, President Lungu faces an election that will be highly contested between his Front (PF), the United Party for National Development (UPND), and the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD).

Classified by: Multiple Sources

Reasons: 1.4 (a), (b), and (d)

Declassify on: 14 SEP 2040

- ~~(C)~~(b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d), (b) (5)

(U) Economy

- (U) The Zambian economy is one of the most stable in sub-Saharan Africa but is subject to fluctuations driven by the world prices of agricultural goods and copper, the two largest exports. The commodities prices super-cycle from 2002-2008 spurred growth rates over 6% and enabled the government to reinvest in economic development and job creation under the "Sixth National Development Program." Falling prices since 2008 have slowed growth under 5%, had a negative impact on currency values and reserves, and have been a source of political turmoil
- (U) Agriculture is the Zambian economy's largest sector, employing 70% of the labor force and producing maize, various grains, soya beans, cassava, fruits, tobacco, and flowers for domestic consumption and export. Uneven economic growth has hampered development in the agriculture sector with only 20% of arable land under cultivation. The second largest sector of the economy is copper and cobalt mining. Limited investment, price fluctuations, and multinational companies' wariness of perceived arbitrary taxation have contributed to the shrinking of the mining sector since the 1970s.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ As Zambia's second largest trading partner, China has played an important and occasionally controversial role in the Zambian economy over the last two decades, with the *kwacha*'s recent turbulence tied directly to falling Chinese demand for copper. The Government of China and various Chinese parastatals have invested heavily in Zambia's economic development through support of its mining sector by providing loan guarantees and financing roads and power plants. In August 2015, however, the China State Construction Company laid off 600 Zambian workers on a road project due to lack of repayment of Chinese government loans.

- ~~(C)~~(b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d), (b) (5)

(U) Political-Military Relationship

- (U) Zambia is a neutral, largely non-aligned state, but is heavily influenced by Chinese assistance. The major task of the Zambian Defense Forces (ZDF) is to preserve external security from incursions of combatants from conflicts in neighboring countries.

- (U) The ZDF faced heavy cutbacks in the 1990s. However, with its limited resources, Zambia has been slowly addressing inadequacies in military training. Zambian forces have had the benefit of training and non-lethal equipment supplied through the U.S. African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. Furthermore, the ZDF's peacekeeping role has provided them with valuable experience as troops receive special training prior to being transferred abroad on peacekeeping missions.

(U) International Contributions

- ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d), (b) (5) [REDACTED]
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- ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d), (b) (5) [REDACTED]
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- ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d), (b) (5) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- (U) Zambia has contributed troops and observers to several UN peace support missions, including in Mozambique, Rwanda, Angola, Sierra Leone, Eritrea/Ethiopia, Burundi, and Liberia.

(U) Regional Relations

- (U) Regionally, Zambia's foreign relations are focused on the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), with South Africa being Zambia's biggest trade partner and one of the primary points of access to the sea. Links with Tanzania, both political and functional, remain critical, and plans are underway to establish development corridors southwest across the Zambezi River and Namibia's Caprivi Strip to the port of Walvis Bay, and east via Malawi to the Mozambican port of Naçala. Zambian rail and power transmission infrastructure is critical to the successful interconnection of suppliers, markets, and ports in Southern, Central, and East Africa.

(U) South Africa

- (U) Economic links, although showing signs of friction over a trade imbalance heavily weighted in South Africa's favor, have been strengthened by South African private investment in Zambia. For example, in August 2002, it was announced that Spoornet South Africa would operate rail freight in Zambia for 20 years. A bilateral commission was established in October 2005 and a Reciprocal Protection and Promotion of Investments Agreement was signed in 2006. The Zambian vice president stated at the beginning of 2013 that there was major trade and investment potential between Zambia and South Africa, and urged more investment in mining, agriculture, and manufacturing specifically. South African government media reported in February 2015 that Zambia has become one of South Africa's top three trading partners within Africa.

(U) Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

- (U) Zambia remained officially neutral in the DRC conflict and played a significant role in the peace process, including hosting the August 1999 ceasefire negotiations. Zambia earnestly tried to protect its territory from incursion by combatants, a task that grew considerably more difficult after November 2000 when the frontline reached the Zambian border.
 - (U) Following agreements on the withdrawal of foreign forces from the DRC, Zambia expressed concern that, although this development was welcome, any instability following this withdrawal and subsequent elections could lead to additional refugees fleeing to Zambia.
 - (U) By the end of 2008, Zambia hosted about 45,253 Congolese refugees. According to the August 2014 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) factsheet, there were still 20,159 DRC refugees in Zambia.
- (U) In early 2011, the DRC and Zambian governments announced that the two states would conclude a bilateral trade agreement specifically aimed at normalizing border trade. There have been sporadic tensions at the border in recent years amid protests by Zambian and Zimbabwean road cargo operators over increasing insecurity and alleged bribe-taking in the DRC.

(U) Zimbabwe

- (U) Relations between Zambia and Zimbabwe for the last decade have been defined by the various Zambian administrations' approaches to Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe.
 - Relations cooled when Former Zambian President Mwanawasa's willingness to speak out against the political crisis in Zimbabwe boosted his international profile. In April 2008, Mwanawasa, who was SADC chairman at the time, also spoke out

against the delivery of a Chinese shipment of military equipment destined for Zimbabwe.

- Rapprochement began when President Banda, Mwanawasa's successor, visited Zimbabwe in April 2009 following an invitation by the new unity government. Zimbabwe held its next presidential and parliamentary elections in July 2013, with Zambia subsequently congratulating President Mugabe on his victory, which Zimbabwe's opposition disputed. President Lungu has extended his predecessor's policies of rapprochement with Zimbabwe.

(U) China

- (U) China's relations with Zambia date back to the 1970s when the Chinese completed the Tanzania Zambia Railway (Tazara), linking Zambia to Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Following a 2005 factory explosion at a Chinese-operated mine that led to the death of 51 Zambian miners, Zambian trade unions and some opposition parties accused Chinese firms of exploiting workers and compromising safety in Zambian copper mines. In 2006, opposition presidential candidate and future president Michael Sata ran on an anti-Chinese platform. In May 2007, a Chinese-run manganese mine was closed indefinitely due to high pollution levels.
- (U) In February 2007, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Zambia in an effort to improve relations and China's popular image in Zambia.
- (U) A major aspect of the "restoration" was an agreement between Presidents Hu Jintao and Mwanawasa including a USD 39 million loan from China for road-building, and the write down of USD 21 million of Zambia's debt. During Hu Jintao's visit, China promised Zambia USD 800 million for the creation of a free trade zone in central Zambia's "copper belt." Zambia's quota of duty-free exports to China also increased, while China and Zambia signed a memorandum of understanding that delineated terms by which China could finance certain educational and health projects. In September 2008, China reportedly spent—with China's Exim Bank providing 85% of the money—USD 400 million to extend the Kariba North Bank power station.
- (U) Mwanawasa's successor, President Rupiah Banda, visited China in February 2010, holding bilateral talks with the Chinese president. The Chinese government subsequently provided a concessional loan of USD 1 billion for investment in crucial infrastructure projects. In May 2010, the China Development Bank agreed to provide equity investment to upgrade the Kafue Gorge hydroelectric plant. In December 2013, the government secured two financing arrangements comprised of grants and loans from China totaling USD 59.7 million, with the funds earmarked for infrastructure development projects.

- ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d), (b) (5)

- (U) In July 2015, the Government of China donated the three riverine craft which make up the Marine unit of the ZDF. At the official launch of the unit, President Lungu stated, "My government shall remain indebted to the People of China, who have remained all-weather friends." The Government of China provided only the boats, with no program for training or spare parts.

(U) Military-to-Military Relationship

- (U) Since the creation of U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), Zambia has participated regularly in various COCOM exercises designed to build partner nation capacity and support regional peacekeeping efforts. With its limited resources, Zambia has been slowly addressing inadequacies in military training. Up to 50 Zambian military personnel each year receive training under the U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which has focused particularly on tactical armor, infantry, logistics, and advanced leadership training for Zambian personnel. Additionally, the army has had the benefit of training and non-lethal equipment supplied through the ACOTA Program.
 - (U) In FY13, Zambia hosted USAFRICOM's annual communications exercise, AFRICA ENDEAVOR, focusing on interoperability and information sharing among our African partners. This exercise is designed to develop C4 tactics, techniques, and procedures the AU, regional organizations, and participating nations can use to support of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and similar peacekeeping missions.
 - (U) Zambia hosted the FY15 Exercise SOUTHERN ACCORD. U.S. Army Africa conducted this USAFRICOM-sponsored exercise series with military forces from the SADC troop-contributing countries of Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and South Africa. SOUTHERN ACCORD uses both Command Post Exercise (CPX) and Field Training Exercise (FTX) activities to exercise U.S. and SADC capabilities to conduct AU/UN-mandated peace operations resulting from a regional, transnational manmade crisis.

(U) Navy-to-Navy/Marine Corps Relationship

- (U) Zambia has no navy and to date, no ongoing engagement with either U.S. Naval Forces, Africa (USNAVAF) or U.S. Marine Forces, Africa (USMARFORAF). The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) posts a Marine Security Guard detachment of eight Marines at Embassy Lusaka.
- (U) In FY15, the ZDF sent one IMET-financed junior officer to the USMC Basic School in Quantico, Virginia.
- (C) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(a), 1.4(b) 1.4(d) (b) (5).
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- (C) (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d), (b) (5)
[REDACTED]
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(U) Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

- (U) There are no active Department of the Navy FMS cases with Zambia.

(U) Zambia Military Forces Overview

- ~~(FOUO)~~ The ZDF consists of the Zambian Army and the ZAF. The Army consists of 16,500 personnel broken into six infantry battalions, one artillery regiment, and one armored regiment with a reserve force of approximately 6000. The ZAF consists of 1600 personnel with one fixed-wing combat squadron, one fixed-wing logistics squadron, one rotary-wing logistics squadron, and one flight training school. The newest unit of the ZDF is the nascent marine force, composed of one squadron of three riverine craft. Zambian military expenditure was approximately 1.55% of GDP in 2012.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ The ZDF is charged under Article VII of the Zambian Constitution with protecting national sovereignty, fostering good will with the Zambian people, and engaging in activities for Zambia's development. The Army has traditionally deployed to the sensitive borders with Angola, Zimbabwe, and the DRC, all of which have seen revolutionary movements since Zambian independence.

Prepared By: (b) (6), DUSN(P) International Affairs, (b) (6)

Key U.S. Themes/Points

- (U) Express appreciation for hosting Exercise SOUTHERN ACCORD.
- (U) Encourage ongoing participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations.
- (U) Congratulate the ZDF on the establishment of the Marine Unit and explore areas of potential future cooperation.

Key People

- U.S. Ambassador to Zambia: Eric T. Schultz
- U.S. Defense Attache: Lt Col Anthony Sidoti (USAF)
- President of Zambia: Edgar Lungu
- Minister of Defense: Richwell Siamunene
- Chief of Staff of the Army: Lt. Gen Paul Mihova

Background**Internal Context**

- The current president, Edgar Lungu, was promoted from his previous post as Minister of Defense (a portfolio he retained until September 2015) upon the 2014 death of his predecessor, President Michael Sata. In 2016, President Lungu faces an election that will be highly contested between his Front (PF), the United Party for National Development (UPND), and the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD).

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International Contributions

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~~SECRET/NOFORN~~
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON DC 20350-1000

INFO MEMO


FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ray Mabus, Secretary of the Navy

Ray Mabus 11/24/15

SUBJECT: Trip Report from Chile, Zambia, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, and Egypt,
29 October – 11 November 2015 (U)

(b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d), (b) (5)



- (U) Below are brief highlights from my stops.

Chile (U)

- (U) I briefly stopped in Chile to embark the USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN 73) as it transited the Straits of Magellan. GEORGE WASHINGTON is headed to Norfolk, Virginia, as part of the complex hull swap with USS RONALD REAGAN (CVN 76) and USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71). During the course of her transit, she will be conducting security cooperation events and port visits around South America as part of SOUTHERN SEAS 2015, to include participation in

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
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UNITAS PAC and LANT. Approximately 1,400 personnel will have spent time on all three hulls, with a total of approximately 3,000 personnel affected by the hull swaps. I also held several All Hands calls with the crew to address issues and questions, and to thank them for their service. Questions raised at the All Hands calls centered around issues including maternity policy and associated sabbatical timing, financial impacts on crew members associated with the hull swaps, relations with Russia, recommended changes to fitness report cycles and processes, uniforms, and changes to military health benefits and pay.

Zambia (U)

(b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(b), 1.4(d) (b) (5)



(b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(d)




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(b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(d)



Tajikistan (U)

- ~~(S/NF)~~ While in Tajikistan, I attended the Marine Security Guard Detachment Marine Corp Birthday Ball as the guest of honor. Additionally, I held an office call with Charge d'Affaires (b) (6) and discussed the security situation in Tajikistan and the broader Central Asian region. (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(c),(d), (b)(5)
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Azerbaijan (U)


- (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d), (b)(5)
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
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(b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d), (b)(5)



Egypt (U)

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


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(b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d), (b)(5)



- (U) While in Cairo, I also had the opportunity to visit and tour Naval Medical Research Unit 3 (NAMRU-3). NAMRU-3 is the oldest of the six Department of Defense overseas laboratories, established in 1946 in Cairo. Its mission is to study, monitor, and detect emerging and re-emerging disease threats of military and public health importance, and develop mitigation strategies against these threats in partnership with host nations, international, and U.S. agencies. An extraordinary testament to the value of NAMRU-3's forward presence and capability, personnel from NAMRU-3 stood up and ran the mobile Ebola lab in Liberia within 48-hours of notification.

cc:

DEPSECDEF

CJCS

USD/P

VCJCS

CNO

CMC

COMUSAFRICOM

COMNAVAF

COMMARFORAF

COMUSCENTCOM

COMNAVCENT

COMMARCENT

COMUSEUCOM

COMNAVEUR

COMARFOREUR

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~